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While it is widely believed that electoral competition influences public spending decisions, 
there has been relatively little effort to examine how recent democratization in the developing world 
has resulted in changes in basic service provision.  There have been even fewer attempts to 
investigate whether democracy matters for public spending in the poorest developing countries, 
where “weak institutions” may mean that the formal adoption of electoral competition has little 
effect on policy.  In this paper I confront these questions directly, asking whether the shift to 
multiparty competition in African countries has resulted in increased spending on primary education.  
I develop an argument, illustrated with a game-theoretic model, which suggests that the need to 
obtain an electoral majority may have prompted African governments to spend more on education, 
and to prioritize primary schools over universities within the education budget.  I test three 
propositions from the model using panel data on electoral competition and education spending in 
African countries.  I find clear evidence that democratically elected African governments have spent 
more on primary education, while spending on universities appears unaffected by democratization.   
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1. Introduction  
 At the time of the African democracy movements of the early 1990s opinions varied widely 
about the effect of democratization on economic performance and on economic policy.  While some 
authors predicted that democracy would be associated with major economic changes, other 
observers were less optimistic, suggesting that the formal trappings of multiparty democracy would 
have only a limited impact.  With several years of hindsight, we can begin to ask whether and how 
policies adopted by elected African governments have actually differed from those pursued by 
authoritarian regimes.  African countries represent an important set of cases for scholars interested in 
investigating whether democratic transitions can have an impact on policy even in “weakly-
institutionalized polities” where democratic rules may be imperfectly respected, and where policy 
choices may depend primarily upon patron-client relationships.  In this paper I ask whether the move 
to multiparty electoral competition that took place in many African countries during the 1990s has 
prompted governments to spend more on primary education.   
This paper contributes to a small but growing literature that examines whether democracies 
behave differently from their authoritarian counterparts when it comes to the provision of public 
services.  Work by Brown and Hunter (1999), Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001), and Ames 
(1987) has found that democracies in Latin America tend to spend more on items like education and 
health than do autocracies.  Brown and Hunter (2004) have found that Latin American democracies 
have spent more on primary education in particular.  Examining a broader sample, Lake and Baum 
(2001) find that democratically elected governments provided significantly higher levels of basic 
services.1  In a follow-up piece, Baum and Lake (2003) show that precisely because basic services like 
health and education lead to accumulation of human capital, democracy has an important indirect 
effect on growth.  My paper contributes to this existing body of research in two ways.  First, it 
                                                 
1 See also Fardmaneshi and Habibi (2000) and Avelino, Brown and Hunter (2001). 
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focuses on a group of the poorest developing countries (i.e. those in Africa) where it is commonly 
suggested that “neopatrimonial” forms of rule imply that the formal institutions of democracy are 
less important for determining outcomes than are personal relationships.  Second, I examine not only 
whether democracy has given rulers an incentive to provide more public services for society as a 
whole, I also focus directly on distributional conflicts between social groups, asking whether 
democracy has resulted in certain groups receiving a larger increase in social spending than others.  
In this way my approach is related to that of Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 
(2003, 2002) who also consider both the incentives for leaders to provide public goods, as well as 
distributional conflicts over spending. 
The logic underlying my argument is that contested elections may have prompted African 
governments to be more responsive to the demands of the rural groups that form the majority of 
citizens in almost all African countries.  Under authoritarian regimes, in contrast, rulers will need to 
be relatively more responsive to urban groups, which can present a more credible threat of political 
unrest, following Bates (1981).  There are strong reasons to believe that when compared with urban 
groups, rural groups in Africa are more concerned with spending on primary education, relative to 
tertiary education.  I formalize the argument using a game-theoretic model that helps identify three 
testable hypotheses; multiparty competition should lead to higher overall education spending, higher 
spending on primary education, and an unchanged level of spending on universities.   
After briefly reviewing evidence from country cases, I test my hypotheses using time-series 
cross-section data covering 44 African countries over the period 1980-1996.  The results show that 
when they are subject to multiparty competition, African governments have indeed tended to spend 
more on education, and more on primary education in particular, while not altering funding to 
universities.  As a result, democracy has resulted in increased overall service provision while also 
having a distributional impact between social groups.  This finding with respect to universities is 
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somewhat surprising given that university students were at the forefront of African pro-democracy 
movements during the early 1990s.  My results are statistically significant in OLS estimates and in 
fixed effects estimates that control for unobserved country effects.  My results are robust to the 
inclusion of a number of control variables, and I also consider a number of potential biases including 
serial correlation, failure to control for electoral fraud, and the possibility that democracy may itself 
be endogenous to education provision.  Finally, given the large number of missing observations for 
education spending in my dataset, I also considered the possibility of sample selection bias.  I repeat 
all of my specifications using multiple imputation estimates where unobserved values for education 
spending were imputed using the AMELIA program developed by Honaker et al (2003) and King et 
al (2001).  In both my listwise deletion estimates in Section 5 and my multiple imputation estimates 
in Section 6, the effect of electoral competition is statistically and substantively significant.  A move 
to multiparty competition is estimated to result in an increase in overall education expenditures by 
1.1% GDP in the both sets of estimates (based on the OLS regressions). 
If my hypotheses about the effect of electoral competition are accurate, then one would 
logically expect that democracy will be associated not only with spending on education, but also with 
education outcomes, such as the percentage of children completing primary school.  I have not 
explored this observable implication in this paper, because African country coverage for primary 
completion rates is significantly sparser than for education spending.  It is worth noting, though, that 
available data show the completion rate is highly correlated with spending on primary education in 
%GDP (pairwise correlation coefficient of 0.66).  If data availability improves in the future, then this 
would be an important subject for future research.  Likewise, another subject for future research 
would be to examine whether democratically elected African governments have also tended to 
pursue agricultural policies or health spending policies that cater to rural majorities.  Rather than 
extending my inquiry to include these additional policy areas, in this paper I have concentrated on 
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presenting as robust a series of statistical tests as possible to ascertain whether there is a link between 
multiparty electoral competition and education spending. 
 In the remainder of the paper I first proceed in section 2 by considering theoretical 
arguments about the link between electoral competition and public spending.  Section 3 then 
considers evidence from several recent country cases.  Section 4 presents cross-country data on 
education expenditures and political competition, and Section 5 presents my listwise deletion 
estimates of the effect of electoral competition on education spending.  Section 6 presents my 
multiple imputation estimates.  Section 7 considers robustness issues, and Section 8 concludes   
2. Electoral competition and education spending 
My hypotheses about education spending result from two simple arguments about 
democracy.  First, democratically elected governments may have a greater incentive than autocrats to 
provide public services for the population as a whole.  Second, they may also place a higher priority 
on providing those services demanded by a majority of the population, placing less priority on 
services preferred by minorities.  These two arguments depend on the assumption that governments 
in political systems with competitive elections face fundamentally different threats to their rule when 
compared with autocratic governments.  In an autocracy, the principal risk for a leader is that he or 
she will be overthrown by force.  In contrast, in countries where there are free elections contested by 
multiple candidates, rulers may still fear losing office through force, but they also need to anticipate 
the possibility of being voted out of office.  In the terminology used by Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
(2003, 2002) elected leaders tend to be chosen by a larger “selectorate” and require a larger “winning 
coalition” than is the case with autocrats.  Because democratically elected governments are more 
accountable to a broad public in this manner, Lake and Baum (2003, 2001) argue that they will have a 
greater incentive to provide public services, rather than spending on “rents”.  Democracy may also 
have consequences for the distribution of spending between groups of citizens, towards electoral 
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majorities and away from minorities.  So, for example, Brown and Hunter (2004) argue that 
democratically elected governments may have an incentive to steer greater resources towards primary 
education, because a broader segment of voters will benefit from spending in this area. 
While the above arguments suggest why a transition to democracy might result in significant 
changes in public service provision, one might doubt whether the formal establishment of multiparty 
competition will make a difference for service provision in some countries.  Acemoglu, Robinson, 
and Verdier (2003) have recently argued that many of the poorest developing countries, notably in 
Africa, are characterized by “weakly-institutionalized polities”, where the formal institutions of 
democracy “neither place significant restrictions on politicians’ actions nor make them accountable 
to citizens.”  Likewise, much of the literature on African politics since the 1990s has continued to 
emphasize the “neopatrimonial” nature of governance where decisions depend upon patron-client 
relationships between individuals, rather than resulting from the outcome of electoral competition 
between political parties proposing different policy platforms.  Callaghy (1993) launched an early 
caution against the assumption that political reform in African countries would necessarily result in 
fundamental changes in economic policies.2  Van de Walle (2003, 2001) argues that democratization 
in Africa has not yet resulted in a fundamental shift in the types of political pressures that African 
leaders face, yet it may eventually trigger changes in policy.   
Given that the majority of electors in almost all African countries live in rural areas, if 
democracy does matter, then one might expect politicians to become more responsive to the 
demands of rural groups when they are subject to electoral competition.  In contrast, in African 
countries where governments are not obliged to compete in free elections, there may be a stronger 
incentive to cater to the demands of urban groups.  It is commonly argued that urban African groups 
have greater influence than rural groups under an autocratic government, because they find it easier 
                                                 
2 See the discussions from this period in Ake (1996), Herbst (1993), Lewis (1996) and Widner (1993). 
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to organize and protest against government policies than do those who live in rural areas.  In a 
seminal contribution, Bates (1981) argued that rural groups in Africa face greater costs of collective 
action because they tend to be distant from a country’s capital, they are geographically separated, and 
they are frequently divided by language and/or ethnicity.  Urban groups in contrast, have the 
advantage of being more geographically concentrated.  According to Bates, differential costs of 
collective action between urban and rural groups helped explain why the economic policies adopted 
by African governments during the 1960s and 1970s tended to exhibit an urban bias.   
 While Bates (1981) did not directly consider education spending, his theory has clear 
predictions for this area of government policy.  To the extent that urban groups in Africa tend, on 
average, to have more years of schooling than their rural counterparts, they are more likely to be 
concerned about government spending on secondary schools and universities, as well as spending on 
primary schools.  Rural groups, on the other hand, should place much greater weight on primary 
school spending alone, because in most cases this is the only formal schooling they are likely to 
receive.  When one turns to explaining which of these African social groups will have more influence 
on education spending, it is important to note that university students in a number of African 
countries have historically been quite willing to demonstrate publicly against governments whose 
policies they oppose.  In fact, university students were at the forefront of pro-democracy movements 
in a number of African autocracies after 1989 (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997).  The same can 
hardly be said for primary school students, or those groups favorable to spending on primary 
education more generally.  These factors suggest that education spending in autocratic African 
countries will be biased against primary education.  Evidence of skewed education policies in African 
countries is readily available; during the 1980s, when almost all African governments were autocratic, 
the ratio between public education spending per university student and spending per primary school 
student was significantly higher in Sub-Saharan Africa than in other regions (Pradhan, 1996).   
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We can expect that democracy in African countries will trigger increased spending on 
primary education, to the extent that it gives governments an increased incentive to cater to a rural 
majority that is primarily concerned with primary education.  However, this argument does depend 
on a number of assumptions.  First of all, the national level of education spending must be a salient 
issue for voters.  This would not be the case if voting choices depend exclusively on regional and/or 
ethnic affiliation.3  A second assumption crucial to the argument is that candidates must face 
incentives to implement promises regarding education spending once elected, based on the 
anticipation that doing otherwise will result in future electoral sanctions.  The case study evidence I 
present in Section 3 suggests that these assumptions have been fulfilled in Uganda but not in Malawi.  
If democracy prompts governments to cater to majority interests favoring primary education 
spending, it is not clear without further specification whether electoral competition will lead to 
increased, decreased, or unchanged spending on universities.  As I show below, this prediction 
depends on one’s assumption about the source of influence for those advocating university spending.  
If university students influence governments primarily through street demonstrations, and they have 
equal ability to launch successful protests under autocracy and democracy, then one would expect 
university spending to be unchanged.  This is a plausible assumption for African countries.  If, in 
contrast, a shift to democracy lifts constraints on students acting as a vocal lobby, then one might 
actually expect spending to increase under democracy (Brown and Hunter, 2004).   
Formalizing the argument 
In what follows I provide a brief formalization of my core arguments.  This formalization 
helps to identify specific testable hypotheses, in particular showing when we would expect the 
                                                 
3 See Posner (2004b), Posner and Simon (2002), van de Walle (2003), Wantchekon (2003), and 
Norris and Mattes (2003) on ethno-regional affiliation, clientelism, and voting in African elections. 
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introduction of electoral competition to result in increased spending on primary education while 
leaving spending on universities unchanged.  
Consider a society divided into two types of citizens: those from rural areas and those from 
urban areas, with the rural group forming a majority.  In this society decisions must be made 
between devoting available revenues to primary education p to university education u and to a third 
category of expenditures x which represent “rents” for an incumbent policymaker.  The distribution 
of expenditures must meet an exogenous revenue constraint (normalized to unity) as presented in 
equation (1) below.  Citizens from rural areas prefer revenues to be spent on primary schools, 
citizens from urban areas prefer revenues to be spent on university education, and both groups have 
a quadratic loss function, as shown in (2) and (3).  The assumption that each group cares only about 
one type of education spending is made for simplicity, and the results can continue to hold under a 
more complex specification.  The loss function of the incumbent policymaker is shown in (4).  The 
incumbent cares about “rents” derived from use of revenues x, as well as about a second parameter 
L.  In the case that the incumbent loses an election or is otherwise unseated from office, the 
parameter L reflects foregone benefits involving prestige, and any other personal benefit from 
holding office that does not derive from consumption of government revenues.  These assumptions 
could be relaxed to allow the incumbent to prefer a non-zero level of education spending.   
1=++ xup       (1) 
2)1( pLrural −=      (2) 
2)1( uLurban −=      (3) 
2(1 )incumbL x= − + L      (4) 
I distinguish between two different scenarios for policy choice.  In the case without electoral 
competition the incumbent faces the risk of being overthrown if urban groups are sufficiently 
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dissatisfied with the chosen spending policy.  If urban groups choose to revolt, then with probability 
q their revolt is successful, the incumbent is unseated, and all revenues are spent on university 
education.  The parameter q is common knowledge.  With probability 1-q the revolt fails, urban 
groups receive disutility of 1, and then the incumbent’s spending policy is maintained.  In the case 
with electoral competition the incumbent still faces the risk of being overthrown through unrest, but 
he or she now also faces a challenge from another candidate.  The challenger has the same loss 
function as the incumbent.4  I also assume for simplicity that the incumbent does not have the 
option of choosing whether to accept electoral competition.  This would be justified to the extent 
that a democratic transition in a country was driven by outside actors or outside trends, as seems 
plausible for much of the wave of democratization in Africa since the end of the Cold War.  In the 
case with electoral competition, since rural voters are assumed to make up the majority, the 
expenditure proposal that minimizes their expected loss will win the election.  In the case where 
challenger and incumbent propose the same policies, the election is decided by a coin toss.  The 
sequence of play in the two scenarios is as follows. 
Without electoral competition With electoral competition 
1. The incumbent chooses a 
distribution of expenditures 
1. The incumbent proposes a 
distribution of expenditures 
2. Urban groups can opt to revolt.  2. A challenger proposes a policy. 
 3. An election occurs and the winner's 
proposal is implemented. 
 4. Urban voters can opt to revolt.   
Take first the case without electoral competition.  Here the preferences of rural citizens are 
irrelevant for the incumbent, because there is no risk of being unseated in an election, and rural 
                                                 
4 Election outcomes where there is a threat of unrest have previously been modeled by Ellman and 
Wantchekon (2000) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2001).   
 10
citizens do not possess an option of revolting.  At stage 1 the incumbent faces two options: either 
spend all revenues on rents and run the risk of a revolt, or compromise by offering urban citizens 
their reservation payoff.  This is the minimum level of spending on universities necessary to dissuade 
them from revolting.  Given that the urban group’s expected loss from revolting is 1-q, their 
reservation constraint will be satisfied as long as 2
1)1(1 q−−≥u .  It will always be equilibrium 
behavior for the incumbent to pursue the compromise strategy.  We can conclude that without 
electoral competition the incumbent will choose the following equilibrium spending allocation – 
spend nothing on primary education, spend 2
1)1( q−1  on university education, and keep −
2
1)1( q− for rents. 
In the case with electoral competition, incumbent politicians still face a potential risk of being 
unseated by revolt, but they also must consider the risk of losing the election.  The election will be 
won by the candidate whose proposal provides a lower expected utility loss for rural voters, given 
that they are in the majority.  The key question, then, is whether at stage 3, rural voters would prefer 
a proposal that gives them their ideal policy p=1, or alternatively, whether they would prefer a 
compromise proposal that provides urban voters with their reservation payoff and then devotes 
remaining revenues to primary schools (in equilibrium electoral competition will drive spending on 
rents to 0).  It will always be equilibrium behavior for both candidates to make the compromise 
proposal: 
1 1
2 21 ) , 1 (1 ) , 0p q u q x= − = − − ={ ( .  A comparison of the equilibrium spending outcomes 
with and without electoral competition leads to the following three hypotheses. 
}
Hypothesis 1: Primary school spending will be higher under electoral competition.   
I will test this hypothesis by examining whether multiparty electoral competition is correlated 
with higher spending on primary schools, measured relative to GDP and relative to total spending.   
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Hypothesis 2: Spending on universities will not depend on electoral competition.     
Given the above assumptions, urban voters concerned with spending on universities can 
influence policy even in a non-democratic context, but a shift to multiparty competition will not 
increase their influence.  As a consequence, spending on universities remains unchanged.  
Hypothesis 3: Total education spending will be higher under electoral competition.  
This result depends on the fact that competition between incumbent and challenger will 
prompt them to reduce spending on rents to zero.   
3. Evidence from recent African elections 
Though the main empirical tests presented in this paper use cross-country data, more 
detailed evidence from individual African election campaigns can also be used to reinforce the 
plausibility of the statistical findings.  This section briefly reviews recent experience in Uganda and 
Malawi with respect to elections and primary education.  The case studies also help identify 
important differences between countries that the cross-country quantitative tests cannot capture, 
given available data.  In particular, the contrast between Uganda and Malawi suggests that when 
voters split sharply along regional lines, election winners may have less of an incentive to deliver on 
national issues like universal primary education.     
 Uganda since 1996 is a clear case of an African country in which the establishment of multi-
candidate elections has helped result in a reorientation of government spending towards primary 
education.  Despite the atypical aspect of Uganda’s “no-party democracy”, where political parties 
exist but cannot officially campaign for candidates, the country’s 1996 presidential election was a 
hotly contested one, which saw the incumbent, Yoweri Museveni, challenged by Paul Ssemogerere, 
the leader of Uganda’s Democratic Party.5  As part of a series of manifesto commitments, Museveni 
                                                 
5 See Stasavage (2004) for a more complete discussion. 
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promised if elected to implement a Universal Primary Education (UPE) program that would abolish 
primary school fees for four children in every family.  Though this promise was not initially intended 
to be the centerpiece of Museveni’s campaign, it received a very favorable response from the 
electorate.  The popularity of the UPE program provides one plausible explanation why Museveni 
was able to win the election by a large margin, attracting 74% of the vote, and even outpolling 
Ssemogerere in the opposition candidate’s own region of Buganda.6  This was certainly the 
conclusion drawn by many of Museveni’s close advisors, as they subsequently urged Ugandan 
Ministry of Finance officials to find the necessary funds to finance the UPE program, arguing “we 
won the election because of the UPE pledge, so we have to come up with the money for it.”7  Since 
1996, the Ugandan government has significantly reoriented expenditures toward primary education, 
and there is clear evidence that performance in the area of education provision has contributed to 
Museveni’s overall popularity (Bratton, Lambright, and Sentamu, 2000).  
 In Malawi in 1994, as in Uganda in 1996, the winning candidate in a presidential election 
moved soon after his victory to abolish primary school feels.  The Malawian government also moved 
quickly to spend more on primary education in order to compensate for the loss of fees.  Primary 
education spending as a percentage of GDP jumped from 1.5% in 1994 to 2.6% in 1995.  However, 
unlike in Uganda, the Malawian government failed to sustain this increased spending, in particular 
after 1999 when education spending dropped dramatically.8  There appear to be two possible 
explanations for this outcome.  First, Malawi in the late 1990s suffered from much greater 
macroeconomic instability than Uganda.  The Ugandan UPE pledge of 1996 was in fact preceded by 
a series of important institutional reforms in the 1990s that led to a dramatic reduction in fiscal 
                                                 
6 based on data reported in The New Vision, Kampala, May 13, 1996. 
7 Interviews with former Ugandan finance ministry officials, December 2002. 
8 See “Malawi: Public Expenditures, Issues and Options”, World Bank.   
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deficits and inflation (Stasavage and Moyo, 2000).  Second, one might also argue that precisely 
because voting in presidential elections in Malawi has been highly polarized along regional lines, 
President Muluzi faced less of an incentive to deliver on this issue in order to be re-elected.  In the 
1994 presidential contest Muluzi won 78% of the vote in Malawi’s southern region, but only 27.5% 
of the vote in the central region, and only 4.5% of the votes in the North.9  In Uganda in 1996 there 
was also a clear regional pattern of voting, with President Museveni, receiving his highest share of 
votes in the west of the country, but Museveni also won over 50% of the vote outside his home 
region.10  Given the regional pattern of voting in Malawi, it would seem unlikely that either of 
President Muluzi’s election victories have depended upon his stance on national issues.    
4. Data on education and electoral competition 
 In order to test my three hypotheses, I use data on the different components of education 
spending compiled by UNESCO, based on reports given by individual African governments.  The 
data is reproduced in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.   Since there is little if any African 
education spending data available before the 1980s, in this study I have concentrated on the period 
1980-96.  It is important to emphasize that the set of observations is not complete.  In some cases 
governments report overall education expenditures but not a detailed breakdown by level of 
education (primary, secondary, tertiary).  In other cases they report on spending for one level of 
education, but they do not report overall public education expenditures.  Finally, in other cases 
governments report nothing at all.  I have compiled data on total education spending for 44 
countries for which the average number of annual observations available over the period is 9.  
                                                 
9 Results reported by Wiseman (2000).  See Posner (1995), Chirwa (1998), and Kaspin (1995) on 
regionalism in Malawian politics.   
10 based on data reported in The New Vision, Kampala, May 13, 1996. 
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Likewise, data on primary education expenditures is available for 40 countries with an average of 6.7 
annual observations per country.  Data on university education is available for 35 countries with an 
average of 5.8 annual observations per country.  Table 1 presents summary statistics.  It is clear from 
the above figures that there is a very significant missing data problem when it comes to African 
education spending.  This raises the risk of a bias in my results to the extent that the process 
determining whether spending is reported is not a random one.  As described below, I address this 
problem by first presenting a series of regressions in Section 5 based on a listwise deletion sample, 
where those observations for which either the relevant education spending variable or any 
independent variable is missing are dropped.  Then, in Section 6 I construct twenty imputed datasets 
using the AMELIA program, creating imputed values for all missing observations of both the 
dependent and independent variables.  Multiple imputation estimates are presented using this data.  
 To measure electoral competition I draw on a dataset compiled by members of the Africa 
Research Program at Harvard University.11  The dataset is ideally suited for testing my hypotheses, 
because it allows for distinguishing those countries where executives were elected in multiparty 
competition from those countries where executives were not subject to this form of competition.  
The data collectors created a six step Guttman scale of openness of executive recruitment. 
1. No executive exists 
2. The executive exists but was no elected 
3. The executive was elected but was the only candidate 
4. The executive was elected and multiple candidates (but not from multiple political 
parties) contested the election 
5. Multiple parties were able to contest the election but opposition parties chose not to 
contest the election. 
6. Candidates from more than one party competed for the executive elections  
                                                 
11 http://africa.gov.harvard.edu//  See the recent papers that have used this dataset including Bates 
and Humphreys (2002), Block, Singh and Ferree (2003), and Ferree and Singh (2002).   
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In the sample used in this study there are three principal groups of country observations.  In 
30% of country-years there is an executive but no electoral competition (level 2).  In a further 40% 
of country-years there was an executive who was elected in a single candidate election (level 3).  
Finally, in a further 26% of country-years the executive was elected and candidates from multiple 
political parties stood in the election (Level 6). 12  I have created a dummy variable Multiparty 
competition which takes a value if 1 if a country falls into the Level 6 group, and 0 otherwise.  The 
hypotheses developed in Section 2 suggest that overall education spending and primary education 
spending will be higher in countries with multiparty competition while spending on universities will 
be uncorrelated with this variable.  My theoretical model provides no specific argument why 
countries that have elections but which do not have multiparty competition should have different 
levels of education spending from those countries with unelected executives.  While it might be of 
interest to also study whether the openness of legislative competition is correlated with education 
spending, in practice in the sample considered here there were extremely few country cases that had 
multiparty competition for the executive but not the legislature.13 
The Multiparty Competition variable used in this paper is similar to another recent election-
based definition of democracy produced by Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000).  
However, their definition adds an “alternation rule” which is a restriction whereby certain 
governments that are elected in multiparty competition but which never actually lose an election are 
classified as authoritarian.  The logic behind this rule is that when governments which face multiparty 
                                                 
12 Level 5 is an empty category, there are only seven observations in Level 1, and only 18 
observations in Level 4. 
13 There were a number of cases that lacked single party competition for the executive but where 
legislators were chosen in multi-candidate elections within a single party.  I found no evidence that 
these countries had different levels of education spending from those without competition. 
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elections have no real chance of losing, the accountability effect of elections will be weak.  Given that 
in African countries during the 1990s a number of leaders of former one-party regimes have retained 
power during multiparty elections, application of the alternation rule here would result in a 
significant reduction of the number of countries classified as having multiparty competition.  While 
the measure used by Przeworski et al (2000) is only available for the period up to 1990, when I 
modified my measure of Multiparty Competition to take account of the alternation rule, I found that the 
empirical results reported in Section 5 below were largely unchanged.  In what follows I have 
nonetheless retained the measure of Multiparty Competition that does not take account of the 
alternation rule, because in some African cases (such as Uganda) electoral competition has prompted 
sitting governments to alter their policies even in cases where the ruling party has been in power for 
some time and has yet to lose an election.   
5. Panel estimates of the determinants of education spending 
 To test my three hypotheses I estimated a series of regressions using three dependent 
variables: (1) overall public spending on education, (2) public spending on primary education, and (3) 
public spending on universities.  I considered each variable both expressed in percent of GDP, and 
expressed as a percentage of total government spending.14  In the regressions in Tables 2-4, each of 
these spending variables is regressed on several independent variables, including the dummy variable 
for Multiparty competition.  My regressions thus test the effect of multiparty competition against all 
other levels of competition pooled together.  This specification best fits my theoretical model.  As a 
control I included a dummy variable for election years in order to distinguish the long-run effects of 
                                                 
14 This latter measure is useful because changes in relative prices in the economy (between the non-
tradeables and tradeables sectors) may lead to apparent changes in spending relative to GDP without 
a government actually altering its budgetary priorities.               
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democracy on spending from more short-run effects attributable to electoral cycles.  I also included 
the log of per capita GDP, based on the conjecture that governments in richer countries may tend to 
spend a greater share of their national income on education.  Two other control variables include % 
population rural and % population under 15.  When the percentage of a country’s population under 15 is 
high, we should expect to see pressures for higher spending on primary education.  Since my 
argument about the distributional effects of education spending emphasizes the importance of an 
urban/rural divide, it also makes sense to include % population rural as a control. 
I also include total overseas aid as a control, based on the fact that when negotiating 
structural adjustment packages, donors in recent years have frequently suggested that governments 
should privilege primary education.  Rather than arguing that aid is directly allocated to education 
expenditures, given that direct donor financing of public education in Africa was limited during this 
period, the argument here is that an increased overall reliance on donor financing may prompt a 
government to pursue expenditure objectives advocated by donors.15  The variable Overseas aid 
represents total overseas development assistance in percent of GDP (compiled by the OECD). 
Unfortunately, no cross-country data is available on the salience of education as an issue, 
which was found in Section 3 to be an important consideration.  I considered one possible proxy by 
using an index of fractionalization of “politically relevant ethnic groups” constructed by Posner 
(2004a).  This was based on the conjecture that fractionalization might be correlated with the salience 
of ethnic divisions as political issues (and thus the non-salience of overall primary education 
provision).  However, the effect of democracy on education did not in practice depend on this 
                                                 
15 This conclusion that direct donor financing of education was limited is supported by evidence 
from Devarajan, Rajkumar, and Swaroop (1999). 
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variable, nor was there clear evidence that ethnic fractionalization was significant when entered 
linearly.  As a consequence it was excluded from the final regressions.16   
Finally, I preferred a static specification here, that does not include a lagged dependent 
variable due to the large number of dropped observations that this would entail in my incomplete 
dataset that contains many gaps.  The discussion of robustness in Section 7 considers whether my 
results may be biased by serial correlation of the error terms, concluding against this possibility.  In 
my multiple imputation estimates presented in Section 6 I include a lagged dependent variable, 
because doing so results in a less significant loss of observations in a complete dataset.   
 The regressions reported in Table 2 test Hypothesis 3 by considering determinants of total 
government spending on education.  Regression (1) is a pooled OLS estimate which shows that 
multiparty political competition is positively and significantly correlated with total government 
spending on education.  A move to multiparty competition is estimated to result in an increase of 
total education spending by 1.1% of GDP.  Spending on education does not seem to be significantly 
different during electoral periods according to these estimates.  A set of dummy variables for 
unobserved year effects was not jointly significant in this specification, and so it was excluded (as was 
the case for all other regressions).  
  Regression (2) is a fixed effects model that controls for unobserved country-specific 
correlates of education spending.  The coefficient on Multiparty competition remained statistically 
significant, although it is now smaller in magnitude than in the OLS regressions.  The election 
variable remained insignificant, and the coefficient on Overseas aid is actually negative and significant.   
                                                 
16The fact that an interaction term (Multiparty competition)x(fractionalization) was generally not significant 
is perhaps not surprising.  Posner (2004a) himself emphasizes that countries might have similar levels 
of ethnic fractionalization at the same time that the salience of these divisions varies.   
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Regressions (3) and (4) repeat the procedure while using as a dependent variable total 
education spending measured as a share of total government expenditures.  In the pooled OLS 
regression the Multiparty competition dummy variable is positive and highly significant.  A government 
subject to multiparty competition is estimated to devote 4.4% more of its total expenditures to 
education than would otherwise be the case.  In the fixed effects model Multiparty competition is again 
highly significant, and only slightly smaller in size.  Finally, the coefficient on the Overseas aid variable 
is again negative and is statistically significant in the OLS but not the fixed effects regression. 
The Table 3 regressions test Hypothesis 1, using the same specifications as in Table 2 but to 
investigate the determinants of government spending on primary education.  In the pooled OLS 
estimates the coefficients on the Multiparty competition variable are positive and highly significant.  
Establishing multiparty competition would be associated with an increase in primary education 
spending by 0.45% GDP, and a 1.5% increase in the share of total government spending devoted to 
primary schools.  In the fixed effects models the coefficients on Multiparty competition are no longer 
statistically significant, and they are smaller in magnitude.  The difference between the OLS and fixed 
effects estimates is attributable to the fact that the country mean values for primary education 
spending, which are subtracted out in the fixed effects model, are positively correlated with the 
Multiparty competition variable.  One main reason for this is that four of the sample countries 
(Botswana, Namibia, Senegal, and Zimbabwe) had both multiparty competition and high levels of 
primary education spending throughout the period where data is available for each country.  In 
addition to the above, the coefficients on Overseas aid are negative and statistically significant in the 
OLS regressions in Table 3. 
The result that overseas aid is negatively correlated with spending on education is surprising 
given the stated objective of many donors of improving provision of primary education.  As will be 
seen in Section 6, this negative correlation between aid and education spending is even more 
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apparent in my multiple imputation estimates.  The result is robust to instrumenting for aid (in order 
to take account of the possibility that it might be endogenous to education spending), as well as to 
considering aid from only one donor (the World Bank).  Nor is there any evidence of a change in the 
negative correlation between aid and education spending between the 1980s and the 1990s due to the 
end of the Cold War.  It should be remembered that the regressions show a significant correlation 
between overall aid flows and education spending.  A study by Devarajan, Rajkumar, and Swaroop 
(1999) found in a smaller sample of African countries that aid flows targeted directly at the education 
sector resulted in a nearly one for one increase in education expenditures.  Though this is strictly 
conjecture, it may be possible to reconcile these apparently divergent findings.  Aid that is targeted at 
education allows governments to spend more on a politically popular service.  At the same time, aid 
that is targeted at other sectors, such as health or agriculture, may also be politically popular and, 
other things being equal, will reduce the necessity for governments to cultivate support by spending 
on education.17  Future research could consider this possibility in greater detail by using more refined 
and more extensive data on aid flows. 
Table 4 reports results of regressions that test Hypothesis 2, where the dependent variable is 
public spending on universities.  This is predicted to not depend on the presence of electoral 
competition, and as a result I expect the coefficient on Multiparty competition to be 0.  In both the OLS 
and fixed effects regressions the coefficient on Multiparty competition is in fact insignificant, which 
supports the hypothesis.  One might also suggest that this result simply reflects a poor estimate of 
the coefficient, but given the confidence intervals from regression 1, with 95% confidence we can 
reject the hypothesis that a shift to Multiparty competition would result in an increase of spending on 
universities of more than 0.04% GDP.  This would be quite a small increase. 
                                                 
17 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for this point.  See Remmer (2004) on this issue. 
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Overall, the results of the regressions in Tables 3-5 provide a strong indication that 
governments subject to electoral competition have spent more on education, and more on primary 
education in particular, and they have not spent more on universities.  These are strong findings 
regarding the effect of democracy, on average, across the sample.  However, it is worth noting that 
there remains a significant amount of variation within the group of democracies.  A quarter of African 
governments elected in multiparty competition have spent less than 1.5% of GDP on primary 
education (compared with the average spending level for democratic governments of 2.3% ).  This 
variation may be due to factors that cannot be adequately captured using existing cross-country data, 
such as the relative salience of ethnic and regional divisions, or other features of the democratic 
process involving availability of information (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004).   
6. Multiple imputation estimates of the determinants of education spending 
 As noted above, there are a large number of missing observations in my education spending 
data, and this presents the potential for bias in the results presented in Section 5.  It may, for 
example, be the case that poorer or less democratic states have a greater tendency not to report 
education expenditures.  There is in fact a positive correlation, but only a weak one, between the 
presence of multiparty competition and the likelihood that a government will report total education 
expenditures (0.07 p=.07) or primary education expenditures (0.09 p=.01).  The likelihood of 
reporting is not correlated with either per capita GDP or the presence of civil unrest.  There is a 
much stronger negative correlation between the likelihood of reporting and the level of aid. 
In order to examine whether my listwise deletion estimates are influenced by the pattern of 
missing observations in the education spending data, I used the AMELIA program to impute values 
for all missing observations in my dataset (Honaker et al, 2003; King et al, 2001).  The imputation 
model included all independent variables, all education spending variables from the Table 2, 3, and 4 
regressions, in addition to total government spending in %GDP.  In the numerous cases where 
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overall education spending is observed but primary and/or university spending is not, the former 
variable turns out to be a good predictor of the latter two.  This is especially true for primary 
education, since on average it comprises 50% of total education expenditures within my sample.  
This increases confidence in the imputation model.  I used an imputation model that was 
multivariate normal with a slight ridge prior, and the “EMis” algorithm was used to generate twenty 
imputed datasets.18  This resulted in a set of complete datasets covering 44 countries over 17 years.  I 
then repeated each of the specifications in Tables 2, 3, and 4 using each of the imputed datasets.  The 
one modification to the specification was that I now included a lagged dependent variable, since 
doing so no longer resulted a large loss of observations.  The final step was to combine the twenty 
estimation results for each specification.  Coefficients were combined by taking the arithmetic mean, 
while standard errors were combined using a formula that takes into account both variance within 
each imputed data set and across each imputed dataset (Honaker et al 2003). 
Table 5 presents the results of my multiple imputation estimates.  In order to facilitate 
comparisons with the listwise deletion results in Tables 2, 3, and 4, for my Multiparty competition 
variable I report both the estimated short-run effect of a move to multiparty competition and the 
long-run effect of such a change.19  My Table 2, 3, and 4 regressions estimate only the long-run effect 
since they do not include a lagged dependent variable.   
The multiple imputation estimates of the determinants of overall education spending are 
quite similar to the listwise deletion estimates from Table 2.  In the OLS regressions the magnitude 
                                                 
18 While King et al (2001) suggest that in many cases it will be sufficient to impute only 5 datasets, I 
have used a larger number here because of the high fraction of missing observations.  
19 If β  is the regression coefficient on multiparty competition, and γ is the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable, then the “short-run effect” is simply β , and the “long-run effect” is /(1 )β γ− .   
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and the standard error of the estimated effect of Multiparty competition are virtually unchanged.  In the 
fixed effects models the estimated effect of a shift to multiparty competition is now slightly larger.  
With regard to other variables, in the fixed effects models the short-run coefficient on foreign aid is 
now negative and significant in 3 of the 4 regressions. 
The multiple imputation estimates of the determinants of primary education spending show a 
positive and statistically significant effect of Multiparty competition in the OLS regressions.  The 
magnitude of the long-run effect reported in Table 5 columns 5 and 7 is virtually identical to that 
observed in Table 3.  In the fixed effects models we now observe that the long-run effect of 
multiparty competition is larger than in the listwise deletion estimates, and in the case where primary 
education is measured relative to total government spending, it is statistically significant.  We also 
observe in these multiple imputation estimates that the coefficient on foreign aid is now negative and 
statistically significant in all four specifications.  Finally, the multiple imputation estimates of the 
determinants of university spending continue to show no significant effect of Multiparty competition. 
Overall, the multiple imputation estimates in Table 5 suggest that my conclusions about 
multiparty competition and education spending are not biased by failure to control for factors that 
influence whether education data are reported.  They also reinforce the finding of a negative 
correlation between education spending and foreign aid.   
7. Alternative specifications and robustness 
 There are a number of potential issues concerning the robustness of my results.20  First of all, 
the measure of multiparty political competition that I have used may not fully reflect the degree to 
which presidential elections are free and open.  In a number of cases where multiple candidates have 
                                                 
20 All robustness tests here refer to the listwise deletion results in Section 5.  I reached similar 
conclusions when performing the robustness tests on the imputed datasets from Section 6. 
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contested an election, incumbents have used various means to rig the outcome.  To examine this 
potential bias I used a new dataset from Lindberg (2004) that records whether international 
observers judged elections to be free and fair or tainted by irregularities.  In all cases where 
multiparty elections were not judged free and fair, I then reclassified the Multiparty competition variable 
from 1 to 0.  All of the results in the Table 2-3 regressions remained robust after this correction.  I 
also explored whether the distinction between countries with multiparty competition but elections 
tainted by irregularities and those with multiparty competition and “free and fair” elections can 
account for the observed variation in levels of primary education spending within the group of 
democracies.  There was some evidence that this was the case, most notably in the OLS regressions, 
but not in the fixed effects estimates.21   
 The specifications in Sections 5 and 6 have tested my hypotheses about the Multiparty 
competition variable by pooling together all other levels of political competition.  My results are also 
generally robust when including both a dummy variable for Multiparty competition and a  dummy 
variable for Single party competition (level 3).  In this alternative specification Single party competition was 
statistically significant in only one of the OLS specifications (Table 3 regression 1), and in this case 
its coefficient was much smaller than the coefficient on Multiparty competition.  In the fixed effects 
regressions Single party competition was sometimes statistically significant.  It had a smaller coefficient 
than Multiparty competition in Table 2 regression 4, and it was statistically significant and similar in size 
to the Multiparty competition coefficient in Table 2 regression 2.  Single party competition was not 
significant in the Table 3 and 4 regressions. 
I also considered whether the results reported in Tables 2-4 are affected by serial correlation 
of the error terms.  This is not an issue with the multiple imputation estimates since these include a 
                                                 
21 The effect of Multiparty competition also did not vary according to the electoral rules in place for the 
legislature (PR vs. majoritarian).  
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lagged dependent variable, and standard Lagrange multiplier tests suggest that serial correlation was 
not present in the residuals of these regressions.  Since these estimation results are very similar to 
those reported in Tables 2-4, this increases confidence that the Table 2-4 estimates are not heavily 
biased by serial correlation.  When I re-estimated the regressions from Tables 2-4, including an AR1 
term, the results with regard to the coefficient on Multiparty competition were generally unchanged.  
However, one of the potential pitfalls in dealing with serial correlation by estimating an AR1 term is 
that in datasets with relatively short time-series, estimates of the autocorrelation parameter are likely 
to prove imprecise.  Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainthan (2004) have suggested an alternative method 
that produces unbiased estimates by ignoring the time-series dimension of the data when estimating 
the coefficient on the independent variable upon which one wishes to draw an inference.  Using this 
method my results with regard to overall education spending also remained significant.  
A further robustness issue involves the endogeneity of democracy.  While democracy might 
lead to higher spending on primary education, increased provision of primary education might also 
make democracy more sustainable.  One main reason is if primary school attendance induces citizens 
to have more favorable attitudes toward the desirability of democratic institutions.22  This could be a 
further potential source of bias in my empirical results.  To consider this possibility, I repeated the 
regressions from Tables 2-4 while instrumenting for the presence of Multiparty competition with the 
percentage of other African states that had multiparty competition in the previous year.  All results 
remained robust when using this procedure. 
 I also considered whether my results altered if one attempted to control for the effect of 
macroeconomic volatility on education spending.  Arguably an uncertain macroeconomic 
environment could hamper the ability of a government to sustain a high level of spending on primary 
education.  As a result, we would expect the variance of education spending to be correlated with 
                                                 
22 See Brown (1999) and Coren (2003) on this subject. 
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indicators of macroeconomic volatility.  I made an initial examination of this possibility by using a 
Breusch-Pagan test to determine whether the residuals from my OLS regressions had multiplicative 
heteroskedasticity related to the size of the government budget deficit.  There was little evidence that 
this was the case.  This certainly does not rule out the possibility that volatility in education spending 
is influenced by macroeconomic volatility, but it does suggest that determining how important this 
effect is will require availability of more complete data.  
 One final robustness issue involved the possibility that the relationship between electoral 
competition and education spending may have evolved over time.  This is certainly a plausible 
possibility, but it is difficult to test, given that the great majority of African governments before 1989 
were classified as not having multiparty competition.  When I split my sample into one dataset for 
1980-88 and one for 1989-96 I observed that while the estimated effect of multiparty competition on 
overall education spending was positive and significant in both sub-samples, the magnitude of the 
effect was much larger during the 1989-96 period.  The effect of multiparty competition on 
university spending was not significant in either sub-sample. 
8. Conclusion 
 It has long been suggested that multiparty electoral competition may be a powerful force 
influencing provision of basic services.  In this paper I have argued that this may be the case even in 
those political environments where it is commonly believed that weak institutions, or the 
“neopatrimonial” nature of politics, indicates that the formal adoption of multiparty democracy will 
have little impact on policy.  In the case of African countries during the 1990s, while the move to 
democracy has not triggered a wholesale turnaround in economic policies, the evidence does show 
that multiparty electoral competition has been associated with greater government spending on 
education, and on primary education in particular.  In addition, I have found that the 
(re)establishment of multiparty electoral competition has had important distributional effects.  
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African governments have increased spending on primary schools while leaving funding for 
universities unchanged.  Though the evidence presented here is robust, there are several important 
issues that should be explored in further research.   
First, further investigation is needed to examine why, even within the group of African 
democracies, some governments devote substantially more resources to primary education than 
others.  There remains a significant degree of heterogeneity within the group of democracies that is 
not fully accounted for by the other explanatory variables in my regressions.  One possibility is that 
the national level of primary education spending is more salient to voters in some countries.  My case 
study comparison of Uganda and Malawi suggests that electoral competition will have a bigger effect 
on education spending in those contexts where electors do not vote primarily on regional lines.  
Another possibility is that variation in access to information about education spending can explain 
differences in the behavior of democratically elected governments on this issue.   
Second, future work could also explore the possibility that democracy and primary education 
provision are jointly endogenous.  There are strong arguments to believe that a democratically 
elected government will spend more on primary education, but there are also sound reasons to 
believe that democracy will be more sustainable in countries where a high percentage of the 
population has had the opportunity to attend primary school.  While much of the initial wave of 
democratization in African countries in the 1990s was probably attributable to global, and therefore 
exogenous events linked to the end of the Cold War, it would seem very important to examine 
whether subsequently, democratic institutions, and in particular free elections, have become more 
fully anchored in those countries with a high initial level of primary education provision.  Ultimately, 
a worthwhile goal would be to perform a simultaneous test of the argument that democracy leads to 
greater primary education spending, and that greater primary education provision reinforces 
democracy.    
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Table 1: Summary statistics for  
government spending on education 
 
 Nobs Mean Within 
country  
stdev 
Between 
country 
stdev 
Min. Max. 
Total spending on education 
%GDP 
400 3.86 0.93 1.64 0.36 10.0 
Spending on primary education 
% GDP 
267 1.91 0.36 1.03 0.33 5.77 
Spending on universities  
%GDP 
202 0.71 0.18 0.32 0.04 1.90 
Total spending on education as 
% of total govt spending 
399 15.5 5.10 5.29 2.37 76.2 
Spending on primary education 
as % of total spending 
267 7.24 1.44 3.08 1.14 17.2 
Spending on universities 
as % of total spending 
202 3.08 0.94 2.64 0.32 15.7 
Note: numbers of available observations differ for each variable because some governments do not provide 
disaggregated statistics about the components of education spending, and governments also vary in whether they 
report separate quantities for primary education, university education, or both.  
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Table 2: Electoral competition and  
overall government spending on education  
 
Spending measure → % GDP % total govt. spending 
 OLS 
(1) 
Fixed 
effects 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
Fixed 
effects 
(4) 
Multiparty competition   1.10*** 
(0.21) 
   .358** 
(.168) 
   4.41*** 
(0.68) 
  3.10*** 
(0.92) 
Election year -.085 
(.388) 
.065 
(.206) 
-0.50 
(1.44) 
-0.12 
(1.12) 
Per capita GDP (log)    1.49*** 
(0.12) 
   .591*** 
(.214) 
   2.32*** 
(0.64) 
   5.65*** 
(1.17) 
Aid (%GDP) -.0004 
(.007) 
  -.021** 
(.009) 
  -.175*** 
(.037) 
-.067 
(.050) 
% population rural    .035*** 
(.010) 
.012 
(.015) 
    .170*** 
(.032) 
  .188** 
(.081) 
% population under 15 .049 
(.039) 
  -.272*** 
(.077) 
  -.190* 
(.102) 
-.561 
(.418) 
Constant   -10.32*** 
(1.84) 
   11.84*** 
(3.70) 
   -18.8*** 
(6.73) 
-7.31 
(20.2) 
N= 365 365 365 365 
R2 0.37 0.26 0.13 0.12 
Standard errors in parentheses (panel corrected standard errors for OLS.  *. **, and *** refer to significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively). 
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Table 3: Electoral competition and government spending on primary education 
 
Spending measure → % GDP % total govt. spending 
 OLS 
(1) 
Fixed 
effects 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
Fixed 
effects 
(4) 
Multiparty competition   .447*** 
(.171) 
 .044 
(.102) 
   1.48*** 
(0.44) 
.439 
(.403) 
Election year -.067 
(.232) 
.031 
(.103) 
-.370 
(.734) 
.175 
(.409) 
Per capita GDP (log)    .577*** 
(.076) 
   .281** 
(.131) 
   .640*** 
(.220) 
 -.841* 
(.516) 
Aid (%GDP)   -.018*** 
(.007) 
-.007 
(.005) 
  -.130*** 
(.017) 
-.024 
(.019) 
% population rural .007 
(.004) 
-.00002 
(.009) 
    .038*** 
(.011) 
.011 
(.036) 
% population under 15 .058 
(.026) 
-.009 
(.042) 
  .317*** 
(.072) 
.016 
(.017) 
Constant   -4.64*** 
(1.47) 
 3.29 
(2.03) 
   -12.6*** 
(4.06) 
10.9 
(8.00) 
N= 247 247 247 247 
R2 0.31 0.10 0.13 0.01 
Standard errors in parentheses (panel corrected standard errors for OLS.  *. **, and *** refer to significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively). 
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Table 4: Electoral competition and government spending on universities  
Spending measure → % GDP % total govt. spending 
 OLS 
(1) 
Fixed 
effects 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
Fixed 
effects 
(4) 
Multiparty competition       -.048 
(.044) 
      -.106 
(.071) 
-.057 
(.320) 
   .091 
(.325) 
Election year -.056 
(.106) 
-.030 
(.066) 
-.369 
(.241) 
-.109 
(.302) 
Per capita GDP (log)    .156*** 
(.045) 
 -.016 
(.072) 
.059 
(.241) 
.455 
(.330) 
Aid (%GDP)  .006* 
(.003) 
      -.004 
(.004) 
      -.032* 
(.018) 
      -.022 
(.017) 
% population rural   -.004** 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.007) 
.009 
(.013) 
.024 
(.031) 
% population under 15  -.017** 
(.008) 
  -.149*** 
(.029) 
      -.034 
(.045) 
  -.639*** 
(.132) 
Constant   .782*** 
(.579) 
   7.77*** 
(1.37) 
   4.03* 
(2.29) 
   28.0*** 
(6.29) 
N= 191 191 191 191 
R2 0.15 0.03 0.03 0.004 
Standard errors in parentheses (panel corrected standard errors for OLS.  *. **, and *** refer to significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively). 
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Table 5: Multiple imputation estimates of electoral competition and education spending 
Spending measure 
→ Overall educ 
% GDP 
Overall educ 
% total spending 
Primary educ 
% GDP 
Primary educ 
% total spending 
University 
% GDP 
University 
% total spending 
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Multiparty comp. 
(long-run effect) 
  1.11** 
(0.45) 
  .585** 
(.298) 
    4.36*** 
(1.20) 
   3.55*** 
(1.35) 
 .389* 
(.211) 
.187 
(.149) 
   1.40** 
(0.56) 
  1.07** 
(0.56) 
    -.044 
(.058) 
-.068 
(.055) 
    -.121 
(.326) 
    -.151 
(.338) 
Multiparty comp. 
(short-run effect) 
    .275** 
(.113) 
 .281* 
(.145) 
    2.20*** 
(0.65) 
  2.11** 
(0.86) 
 .125* 
(.069) 
.103 
(.083) 
   .782** 
(.319) 
 .767* 
(.408) 
    -.018 
(.024) 
-.040 
(.032) 
-.059 
(.157) 
   -.092*** 
(.203) 
             
             
Spending(t-1)  
(lagged dep. var.) 
   .752*** 
(.047) 
   .519*** 
(.043) 
    .494*** 
(.076) 
   .407*** 
(.053) 
   .679*** 
(.055) 
   .447*** 
(.050 
   .442*** 
(.080) 
   .284*** 
(.067) 
   .588*** 
(.067) 
   .413*** 
(.055) 
   .512*** 
(.084) 
   .392*** 
(.057) 
Election year .024 
(.196) 
-.019 
(.200) 
-.268 
(.874) 
-0.44 
(1.01) 
-.028 
(.112) 
-.030 
(.106) 
-.132 
(.477) 
-.179 
(.497) 
-.032 
(.050) 
-.039 
(.031) 
-.128 
(.240) 
-.145 
(.266) 
Per capita GDP (log)    .418*** 
(.094) 
  .347** 
(.152) 
   .980** 
(.450) 
1.01 
(0.86) 
   .246*** 
(.056) 
  .224** 
(.097) 
  .574** 
(.241) 
.687 
(.492) 
    .069*** 
(.022) 
.044 
(.039) 
    -.079 
(.115) 
.041 
(.232) 
Aid (%GDP) .001 
(.003) 
-.009* 
(.006) 
  -.076*** 
(.021) 
  -.067** 
(.030) 
 -.005** 
(.002) 
  -.014*** 
(.004) 
  -.063*** 
(.014) 
  -.066*** 
(.016) 
.001 
(.001) 
0005 
(.0016) 
  -.016*** 
(.005) 
-.008 
(.008) 
% Population rural    .010*** 
(.003) 
.001 
(.013) 
   .063*** 
(.019) 
    -.022 
(.061) 
 .004* 
(.002) 
  -.004*** 
(.008) 
-.022* 
(.012) 
.0057* 
(.034) 
-.0003 
(.0009) 
-.002 
(.004) 
 .0005 
(.0048) 
-.023 
(.019) 
% Pop. under 15 .012 
(.016) 
   -.045 
(.043) 
.093 
(.072) 
.042 
(.206) 
.012 
(.011) 
  -.019*** 
(.023) 
 .075 
(.049) 
-.019 
(.012) 
    -.001 
(.004) 
-.010 
(.010) 
    -.012 
(.021) 
.005 
(.053) 
Constant   -3.00*** 
(1.12) 
1.64 
(2.61) 
-6.71 
(5.48) 
 2.6 
(12.8) 
 -1.77** 
(0.72) 
0.33 
(1.39) 
   -3.93*** 
(3.36) 
2.69 
(7.67) 
-.069 
(.274) 
.730 
(.613) 
   2.72*** 
(1.50) 
3.01 
(3.41) 
N= 704            704 704 704 704 704 704 704 704 704 704 704
           
Multiple imputation estimates with missing values imputed using the AMELIA program developed by Honaker, Joseph, King, Scheve, and Singh (2003).  OLS refers to pooled 
time-series cross-section and FE refers to fixed effects.  Coefficients and standard errors computed using Ken Scheve’s multiple imputation estimation program.  (panel corrected 
standard errors for OLS.  *. **, and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively). 
 
 37
